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PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: A CLOSED
MARKETPLACE
1. INTRODUCTION: THE CONTROVERSY
Get murdered in a second in the first degree
Come to me with faggot tendencies
You'll be sleeping where the maggots be...
Die reaching for heat, leave you leaking in the street
Niggers screaming he was a good boy ever since he was born
But fluck it he gone
Life must go on
Niggers don't live that long'
Allen Iverson, 2 a.k.a. "Jewelz," 3 from the song "40 Bars."
These abrasive lyrics, quoted from Allen Iverson's rap composition "40
Bars," sent a shock-wave of controversy throughout the National Basketball
1. Dave McKenna, Cheap Seats: Bum Rap, WASH. CITY PAPER, July 6-12, 2001,
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/archives/cheap/2001/cheap0706.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
2. Allen Iverson, a 6-foot, 165-pound shooting guard, currently of the Philadelphia 76ers, was
born June 7, 1975 in Hampton, Virginia. Players: Allen Iverson, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?statsid=3094 (last visited Jan. 17, 2003). After attending
Georgetown University, Iverson was the first player selected in the 1996 NBA draft. Id Iverson was
both the NBA All-Star Game and regular season MVP during the 2000-2001 season, and led his team
to the NBA Finals. Id. His career scoring average is 26.9 points per game. Id.
3. "Jewelz" is the musical alias Iverson chose to record his album under. Kenneth Shropshire,
Fairgame: Allen Iverson v. John Rocker: The Pot and the Kettle, AFRICANA.COM,
http://www.africana.com/Column/blfairgame_09.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). Iverson chose
this name in reference to the character of the same name played by actor Samuel L. Jackson in the
film Pulp Fiction. Id. In that film, Jackson's character was a professional contract killer. Id
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Association (NBA) in the year 2000. 4 Earlier that year, Iverson, a superstar
guard and reigning league MVP for the Philadelphia 76ers, had signed a
record contract with Universal Records to fulfill a childhood dream of
recording a rap album.5 After months of painstaking work in the studio,
Iverson released the first single, "40 Bars," to radio in October 2000, with the
full album, Non-Fiction, soon to follow. 6 Upon its release, the song's lyrics
immediately garnered widespread criticism from the media, gay and lesbian
groups, civil rights activists and, perhaps most importantly, NBA
Commissioner David Stem. 7 Stem wasted little time in chastising Iverson for
using lyrics that he characterized as "coarse, offensive, and antisocial," and
further stated that Iverson had "done a disservice to himself, the Philadelphia
76ers, his teammates, and perhaps all NBA players." 8 Stern thus encouraged
Iverson to return to the studio to re-record the song with what he characterized
as "less offensive" lyrics.9  After initially refusing, Iverson reluctantly
agreed. 10 For the next several months, Iverson and Stem would engage in a
very public battle over the album's contents, culminating in Iverson's decision
to cancel the album's release.ll
While Stern neither fined nor suspended Iverson for the controversial
lyrics, the inescapable question remains: should he have been able to? While
surprising to many, as the state of professional sports leagues currently stands,
Stern does have that ability in his arsenal. According to one commentator:
Stem, a lawyer, knew and said that, as was the case with [John]
Rocker, the league could do whatever it felt to be best in this situation,
without any violation of the athlete's free speech rights. According to
Stem, "The NBA is a private organization. Whatever constitutional
right of free speech an individual may have, there is no constitutional
4. Larry Platt, Allen Iverson's Bum Rap, SPORTSJONES.COM, (Oct. 18, 2000),
http://www.sportsjones.com/sj/462.shtml [hereinafter Iverson 's Bum Rap].
5. Rob Maaddi, Iverson Won't Release Rap CD, DETNEWS.COM,
http://detnews.com/200 1/pistons/ 01 10/02/sports-308200.htm (Oct. 2, 2001).
6. Id. Following the controversy with Stem, Iverson decided to change the title of his CD to
Misunderstood. McKenna, supra note 1.
7. McKenna, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. See Corey Moss & Tina Johnson, Misunderstood Allen Iverson Skips Hip-Hop for Hoops,
MTv.COM, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1449517/20011002/story.jhtml (Oct. 2, 2001).
10. Stern Words: NBA Convinces Iverson to Change Lyrics, CNNSI.CoM, http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/basketball/nba/news/2000/10/12/iverson-stemap/ (last modified Oct. 13, 2000).
11. Maaddi, supra note 5. Prior to training camp in 2001, Iverson made the following statement:
"'I'm through with it... [i]t's something I always wanted to do. It was a childhood dream of mine,
just like basketball. But I feel like people took it the wrong way. It kind of took all the excitement
out of it."' Id.
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right to participate in the NBA and I have the power... to disqualify
players who engage in offensive conduct-including inappropriate
speech."'12
The controversy generated by 'Iverson's "40 Bars" is not an isolated
incident. Over the years, there have been a number of well-publicized
examples of professional athletes being fined, suspended, or both for
exercising First Amendment rights many of us believe to be absolute.13 These
examples have arisen in a number of contexts, including, among other things,
speech relating to religion, 14 speech involving criticism of league officiating,
15
and racially insensitive speech. 16 Because professional athletes face media
scrutiny unimaginable to the average person, particularly peculiar concerns are
created.
The aim of this comment is to discuss and analyze several recent examples
of professional sports leagues disciplining athletes for speech and religious
expression against the backdrop of traditional First Amendment principles.
12. Shropshire, supra note 3.
13. See generally Ali v. State Athletic Comm'r of N. Y., 308 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(noting the court's denial of Ali's motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that the New
York State Boxing Commission's decision to suspend Ali's boxing license following his conviction
for draft evasion was irrational and unsupported by evidence); Major League Baseball Players Ass'n
v. Comm'r of Major League Baseball, 638 PLIIP at 765 (2001) (Das, Arb.) (detailing an arbitrator's
reduction in Commissioner Selig's discipline of Rocker) [hereinafter Rocker Arbitration]; Kelly. B.
Koenig, Mahmoud Abdul-Raufs Suspension for Refusing to Stand for the National Anthem: A "Free
Throw" for the NBA and Denver Nuggets, or a "Slam Dunk" Violation of Abdul-Rauf's Title VII
Rights?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 377 (1998) (discussing the Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf suspension); Ross
Newhan, Now, Baseball Has Spoken, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at D1 (describing Major League
Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig's fine and suspension of Rocker); Jeff Pearlman, At Full Blast,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 27, 1999, at 60 (detailing a series of inflammatory comments concerning
among other things, New York City, welfare recipients, homosexuals, and foreigners made by then-
Atlanta Braves pitcher John Rocker); Carol Slezak, Comments Cost Worm $50,000, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
June 13, 1997, at 136 (detailing the NBA's discipline of then-Chicago Bulls forward Dennis Rodman
for comments he made about Mormons).
14. For an example, see PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT,
CASES, PROBLEMS 883-84 (2nd ed., West 1998) (discussing the New York State Athletic
Commission's revocation of Muhammad Ali's boxing license following Ali's refusal to be inducted
into the military). This incident will be given a more in-depth treatment in the pages that follow.
15. Over the years, there have been a plethora of incidents in this area. A discussion of all of
them is beyond the scope of this comment. However, for a recent and notable example, see Marc
Stein, Whistle Blower: Mark Cuban, Dallas Maverick Owner, Gaining Support for his Crusade
Against League Referees, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 11, 2002, at C2 (discussing several recent
fines levied against Dallas Mavericks' owner Mark Cuban by NBA Commissioner David Stem for his
continual criticism of the quality of NBA officiating).
16. For a recent example of such an incident in professional sports, see WEILER & ROBERTS,
supra note 14, at 75 (discussing Major League Baseball's imposition of a one-year suspension and
$25,000 fine against Cincinnati Reds owner Marge Schott following her use of a number of racial
slurs, such as "dumb niggers" and "money-grubbing Jews").
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This will be done to help the reader conclude that professional sports leagues
are not currently providing their athletes with sufficient free speech and
expression protection. League unions, as agents of their members, must exert
more pressure on league management to agree to changes in league
constitutions, bylaws, and collective bargaining agreements that will afford
professional athletes with a greater degree of First Amendment protection.
The first portion of this comment will provide a brief constitutional
background discussing the origin and evolution of First Amendment principles
in the United States of America. The comment will then proceed to explain
the principal concepts of the state action requirement. After doing so, this
general legal framework will be applied to the world of professional sports
leagues by discussing the current state of commissioner disciplinary authority,
private association law, and the interaction between league constitutions and
collective bargaining agreements. Next, several recent examples of
commissioner disciplinary determinations that have raised First Amendment
concerns will be discussed. Lastly, a brief proposal for reforming professional
sports league constitutions and collective bargaining agreements will be
advanced.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: WHY DO WE VALUE FREE SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION?
Countries and governments are often defined by the ideals they seek to
foster and protect. 17 There is perhaps no greater modern day example of this
idea than the United States of America. Dating back to the earliest days of its
existence, the United States has been admired and emulated as the ideal model
of the democratic way of life. 18 While there may be no single characteristic
that truly defines a democracy, many commentators have pointed to the
concepts of freedom of speech and expression embodied in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution as a logical starting point.19 For
example, in the 1937 Supreme Court case Palko v. Connecticut, Justice
Cardozo characterized the First Amendment as "the matrix, the indispensable
17. See generally Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (George Lawrence trans.,
J.P. Mayer ed., Harper Perennial 1966) (discussing democracy as it existed in the United States as the
model form of government for other countries to emulate).
18. According to de Tocqueville, "I admit that I saw in America more than America; it was the
shape of democracy itself which I sought." Id. at 19.
19. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 962 (14th ed. 2001)(quoting Justice Brandeis' concurrence in the case Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927),
in which he made the comment, "[tihose who won our independence believed that the final end of the




condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 20
Commentators have identified three principal societal functions First
Amendment rights are designed to enhance: (1) "advancing knowledge and
'truth' in the 'marketplace of ideas,"' (2) "facilitating representative
democracy and self-government," and (3) "promoting individual autonomy,
self-expression and self-fulfillment."'21  Over the years, these ideals have
become firmly imbedded in our constitutional jurisprudence, and attempts to
scale them back have been met with rabid hostility.22
Contrary to popular belief, while perhaps fundamental to our American
ideal of democracy, First Amendment rights are not absolute.23 Even the most
cursory examination of First Amendment caselaw makes this concept
abundantly clear. Courts have long recognized that some forms of speech and
expression are entitled to more protection than others, 24 and some groups of
persons have been provided more First Amendment protection than others.25
For example, over the years, courts have concluded that speech relating to
incitement, fighting words, libel, and obscenity lies completely outside the
shadow of protection cast by the First Amendment, 26 and courts have afforded
the First Amendment rights of minors less protection than the First
Amendment rights of adults.27 While many commentators have questioned
20. 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
21. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 959.
22. Id.
23. "As written, the First Amendment is simple and unqualified. But, there has been a broad
consensus that not all expression or communication is included within the 'freedom of speech."' Id.
at 956. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (discussing the limits on
First Amendment rights).
24. See generally Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (rejecting petitioner's First
Amendment defense to an arrest for disorderly conduct resulting from a speech to a "hostile
audience").
25. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that "educators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns"). But see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate").
26. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 956.
27. See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. 260. In that decision, the Court noted the
following:
[T]he First Amendment rights of students in the public schools "are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings," and must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment." A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its "basic
educational mission," even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.
Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
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the validity of these distinctions, the more pressing constitutional issue may be
the extent to which First Amendment rights can be protected in what has
traditionally been labeled the "private sector."
III. THE PROBLEM: THE PRIVATE ACTOR/STATE ACTOR DICHOTOMY
According to the text of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 28  As originally
interpreted, these words were thought to apply exclusively to the federal
government. 29 However, as the years passed, "governmental involvement in
the private sector became more pervasive, [and] traditional notions as to what
activity constitutes 'state action'. . . [became] blurred. '30 In recognition of
this fact, Congress subsequently passed the Fourteenth Amendment to
incorporate the same constitutional limitations imposed on the federal
government onto entities that can be fairly characterized as "state actors. '31
While the idea appears noble, its interpretation and application has proved
problematic.
While facially the First and Fourteenth Amendments may appear
relatively unambiguous, judicial interpretation of their language has led to a
great deal of constitutional debate. 32 The main source of this debate lies in the
seemingly straightforward language, "[n]o State shall.., deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'33 The Supreme Court
of the United States has come to an extremely strict understanding of what it
believes the Founding Fathers intended this language to mean. 34 In the
Court's opinion, the word "State" as expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment
should be interpreted to mean just that, "'[n]o State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, property, without due process of law.' 35  In other
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 433-50 (discussing the historical
developments in the incorporation controversy).
30. Id. at 958-59 (discussing the impact the Sedition Acts had on the United States presidential
election of 1800).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. Sue Davis, The Supreme Court: Finding State Action... Sometimes, 26 HOw. L.J. 1395,
1395 (1983).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
34. Davis, supra note 32, at 1395.
35. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added)).
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words, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not protect United States
citizens from constitutional violations by individuals acting in a private
capacity. 36 In order for constitutional protection to be triggered, alleged
wrongdoers must "'carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in
some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse
it.' 37 This concept has become known as the "state actor" requirement.
The underlying theory behind the state actor principle was to strike a
delicate balance between "'preserv[ing] an area of individual freedom by
limiting the reach of federal law and avoi[ding] the imposition of
responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control,'... [and] assur[ing]
that constitutional standards are invoked 'when it can be said that the State is
responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.' 38
Until the early twentieth century, the Court was extremely strict in its
application of the state actor requirement. 39 Beginning with the Civil Rights
Cases in 1883,40 courts vehemently adhered to the traditional fine line drawn
by the state actor/private actor dichotomy. 41 In the absence of congressional
legislation, courts were unwilling to find conduct that was exclusively private
to be violative of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. The Court's rationale
behind this strict adherence seems to have been based on the belief that
governmental intervention in matters of private discrimination lies outside of
the firm judicial boundaries established by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
should instead be dealt with by the legislative and executive branches of state
and federal governments. 42 Judicial intervention could potentially thrust the
Court into an area in which it had little to no expertise. That was a risk the
Court was unwilling to take.
Following the Civil Rights Cases, however, the Supreme Court began to
vastly expand the traditional boundaries of the state actor requirement.43 For
example, against vigorous dissent, Supreme Court rulings in mid-twentieth
36. Id.
37. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (quoting Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)).
38. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(citations omitted).
39. Davis, supra note 32, at 1397.
40. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (holding that "[c]ivil rights... cannot be impaired
by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or
judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such
authority, is simply a private wrong; or a crime of that individual .....
41. Davis, supra note 32, at 1397-98.
42. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982).
43. Davis, supra note 32, at 1397-98.
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century cases such as Marsh v. Alabama,44 Shelley v. Kraemer,45 Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority,46 and Reitman v. Mulkey47 extended the state
actor concept to new extremes. This expansion was due in large part to the
Court's development of three theories, known as the "public function" theory,
the "state encouragement" theory, and the "nexus" theory, by which, if
satisfied, state action could be found.48 While a complete explanation of these
three theories is beyond the scope of this comment, some time must be
devoted to discussing them.
Under the public function theory, courts ask whether "the private entity
exercise[s] powers which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state."49
In other words, the public function theory operates under the assumption that
certain conduct of private parties should be subject to constitutional restraints
because it closely resembles activities traditionally engaged in by the
government. Thus, the focus of the public function theory is the particular
activity being engaged in by the party in question. The Supreme Court's
decision in Marsh, which declared that a "company town's" attempts to
eliminate the dissemination of religious materials satisfied the state actor
requirement, represented the public function theory's high water point.50
Today, further extension of the "public function" strand appears unlikely due
to the Court's extremely stringent "traditionally exclusively" standard in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 51
When dealing with the state encouragement theory, courts examine "the
44. 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (holding that a "company town" in Alabama was subject to
Constitutional protections and state regulation "[s]ince [its] facilities are built and operated primarily
to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function .. " (emphasis
added)).
45. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that "[by] granting judicial enforcement of... restrictive
agreements... the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore,
the action of the state courts cannot stand").
46. 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (holding that "when a State leases public property in the manner
and for the purpose shown to have been the case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment
must be complied with by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants written into
the agreement itself").
47. 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (affirming the state court determination that an amendment to a
state constitution upholding the right of property owners to discriminate in land sales
unconstitutionally involves the state in private racial discrimination).
48. These theories became instrumental in determining state actor questions due to the fact that
the Court has never developed a bright-line state actor "test." Instead, the Court has insisted on
making case-by-case determinations of state action. The three theories mentioned above have aided
in these determinations. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295-98.
49. Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
50. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09.
51. 419 U.S. 345 (1974); see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 871, 877.
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quantity and quality of encouragement, coercion and direction on behalf of the
governmental entity toward the private entity. '52 Under this test, a state will
be held responsible for the actions of a private party only when the state can be
said to have coerced or encouraged the private party to the extent that the
decision may be fairly attributed to the state itself.53 Mere designation or
delegation of duties traditionally associated with the state will not suffice.54
Thus, this theory focuses not upon the type of activity being engaged in, but
upon governmental encouragement or authorization of private conduct. An
example of the Court's use of this theory can be seen in the 1967 case Reitman
v. Mulkey, in which the Court held that a state constitutional amendment,
repealing laws that had prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of land,
constituted state authorization of discrimination in the housing market. 55
Lastly, under what is referred to as the nexus theory, courts look for such a
significantly "'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that
seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' 56
In other words, when using the nexus theory, courts look for "sufficient points
of contact between the private actor and the state to justify imposing
constitutional restraints on the private actor or commanding state
disentanglement. '57 The nexus theory centers on the relationship between the
private party and the government. An example of the Court's use of the nexus
theory can be illustrated by the case Shelley v. Kraemer, in which the Court
found that a state's judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
constituted sufficient state involvement to find the state actor requirement
satisfied. 58
As time passed, more and more Supreme Court justices were becoming
concerned that the state action doctrine, as expressed in the previously
mentioned cases, was coming dangerously close to entirely subsuming the
private sector;59 and as a result, subsequent Court opinions, such as
52. David J. Pierguidi, Note, CIVIL RIGHTS-State Action-Absent Strong Connections to a
State Government, a High School Athletic Association Cannot be Construed as a State Actor,
Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 180 F.3d 758 (6"' Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000), 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 457, 461 (2000).
53. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 763-64.
54. Id. at 764 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. 345).
55. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381.
56. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351).
57. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 871.
58. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
59. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 395 ("I believe the state action required to bring the Fourteenth
Amendment into operation must be affirmative and purposeful, actively fostering discrimination.")
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Jackson,60 sharply curtailed findings of state action. Contemporary decisions
of the Supreme Court seem to favor the Jackson approach.61 As we shall soon
see, this modem trend of Supreme Court reluctance to find state action in the
private sector has transcended the world of professional sports.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH RIGHTS TO THE WORLD OF
SPORTS
A. The Status Quo: The Current State of League Constitutions and Collective
Bargaining Agreements
While recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that in certain
circumstances high school athletic associations can qualify as state actors,
62
traditionally private entities such as the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA),6 3 the United States Olympic Committee (USOC),64 and
professional sports leagues have maintained their private actor status. 65 As a
result, the NCAA, the USOC, and professional sports leagues 66 have been left
60. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350 (holding that "[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state
regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
61. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005-12 (1982) (holding that state action was not
present where privately owned nursing homes were receiving reimbursements from the state for
caring for Medicaid patients); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982) (finding that a
private school regulated by public authorities and primarily deriving its income from public sources
was not engaged in state action when firing employees). But see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 (finding state
action in a "private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property").
62. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 303-05 (holding that a wholly intrastate high-school athletic
association comprised mainly of public schools (84%) constituted a state actor under the "public
entwinement" theory).
63. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199 (holding that NCAA member schools conduct their "athletic
program[s] under color of the policies adopted by the NCAA, rather than... those policies [that]
were developed and enforced under color of [state] law").
64. DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding
that the USOC is not a state actor).
65. Karen Martin Dean, Can the NBA Punish Dennis Rodman? An Analysis of First Amendment
Rights in Professional Basketball, 23 VT. L. REv. 157, 159-60 (1998) (describing the NBA as a
private entity). But see Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 93-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (relying on Burton
to find that Yankee Stadium qualifies as a state actor).
66. In the 1978 district court case Ludtke v. Kuhn, the court relied heavily on Burton to conclude
that because Yankee Stadium received public funding, it could be considered a state actor for
constitutional purposes. See generally Ludtke, 461 F. Supp. 86. In Ludtke, a female sports reporter
for SPORTS ILLUSTRATED challenged former Major League Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's
league-wide ban on the admission of female sportswriters to team clubhouses. Id. at 87-88. Ludtke
was sent to Yankee Stadium to cover the 1977 World Series between the New York Yankees and the
Los Angeles Dodgers. Id. at 90. After being denied access to the Yankee clubhouse following a game,
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free to establish and enforce their own governing rules, subject only to the
tremendously deferential restraints of private association law.67
In professional sports leagues, which are the principle focus of this
comment, league rules are embodied in league constitutions and are binding
upon players by way of standard player contracts and documents known as
collective bargaining agreements (CBA). 68 As one may expect, league
constitutions are responsible for defining and outlining league rules, policies,
and procedures. CBAs are essentially agreements made between employer (in
this case, either Major League Baseball (MLB), the NBA, the National
Football League (NFL), or the National Hockey League (NHL)) and union
that define labor conditions and create a contractual relationship between
player, team, and league.69 These agreements vary by league, but at a
minimum will cover the following areas: "club discipline, non-injury
grievances, commissioner discipline, injury grievances, the [standard player
contract], college draft, option clauses, waivers, base salaries, access to
personnel files, medical rights, retirement, insurance and the duration of the
Ludtke filed suit against Kuhn for sexual discrimination on equal protection and due process grounds.
The court concluded that because the City of New York owns the land upon which the stadium was
built, used public funds to build and maintain the stadium, and received financial benefit from the
stadium's continued operation, Kuhn's policy could be deemed state action. Id. at 96. While this may
indeed be the case, more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to indicate that if this case were
filed to today, a different outcome would be likely. In the 2001 Supreme Court case Brentwood, the
Court synthesized nearly 130 years of state action law and declared four theories upon which state
action may be found: (1) the public function theory; (2) the nexus theory; (3) the state encouragement
theory; and lastly, and most recently, (4) the entwinement theory. 531 U.S. 288. When examined
under this contemporary legal framework, it appears unlikely that New York's actions would be
enough to warrant a finding of state action, as courts have now explicitly stated that the mere receipt
of federal funds in and of itself is not enough to trigger state action. See generally Blum, 457 U.S.
991. Absent the receipt of state funds, it appears unlikely that the totality of the circumstances
presented in Ludike would compel a finding of state action.
67. See generally Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of
Professional Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete
Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1430 (1990) (noting that "[a]s a general rule, courts avoid
intervention in questions involving voluntary associations and the enforcement of their bylaws or
disciplinary rules"); Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best
Interests" Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1679-91 (1999)
(discussing several examples of judicial deference to disciplinary determinations of former Major
League Baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn).
68. For example, in Major League Baseball, the requirements of the Major League Agreement,
including commissioner "best interests" authority, are bound upon all players by way of Schedule A,
§ 9(a) of the league collective bargaining agreement. BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN
LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, EFFECTIVE JAN. 1,
1997, Schedule A, § 9(a) (1997) [hereinafter MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT].
69. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (7 h ed. 1999).
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c.b.a." 70 As one can see, CBAs in professional sports leagues cover a wide
variety of working conditions.71 However, for purposes of this comment,
none are more important than those pertaining to league disciplinary
determinations and individual rights.
B. "Best Interests" Authority of Professional Sports League Commissioners72
All organizations need chief executive officers in order to ensure that
operations run smoothly. In traditional professional sports leagues such as
MLB, the NBA, the NFL, and the NHL, league authority to discipline players
is vested in commissioners by way of league constitutions. 73 "What makes
sports unique (by comparison with the movie world, for example) is that the
office of the commissioner has historically been viewed as the supreme voice
about what truly is in the best interests (not just the business interests) of the
game."74
In order to play in a professional sports league, as is essentially the case
with any private association, athletes, in signing standard player contracts,
must agree to comply with league constitutions and CBAs. Among other
things, these documents require players to abide by disciplinary
determinations made by league commissioners. 75 Thus, as a result of standard
player contracts, professional sports league commissioners are empowered
with the authority to exert a great deal of control over the actions and activities
of professional athletes through what is known as their. "best interests"
authority.
MLB was the first professional sports league to recognize the need for a
commissioner, hoping that such an authority figure could help to restore public
70. WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW 45 (2 nd ed. 2000).
71. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 429-30 (4th ed. 2000)
(discussing several "key areas" of collective bargaining agreements in professional sports).
72. While the authority of commissioners in professional sports leagues is not limited to "best
interests" authority, best interests authority will be the focus of this comment due to the fact that it is
the broadest authority possessed by commissioners.
73. See generally MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, supra note 68, art. XII (1997); NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT JAN. 1999, art. VI (1999);
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000, art. XI (1993);
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT: NHLPA/NHL, art. XVIII
(1995).
74. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 2.
75. Jeffrey A. Dumey, Comment, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League
Baseball's Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581, 597 (1992) ("Thus, a person entering Major
League Baseball as an owner, player, or employee must accept the jurisdiction of the Commissioner
and disciplinary process under the 'best interests of baseball' clause."). Id.
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confidence and integrity76 to a game in desperate need of that following the
"Black Sox Scandal" in 1919. 77 Prior to 1919, the game of baseball had
achieved immense honor and popularity in the United States. 78 "While other
commercial sports of the era, most notably racing and boxing, were
notoriously suspected of improprieties, professional baseball remained the
lone sport on the 'top shelf of honor."' 79 The Black Sox scandal, however,
would quickly change all of that, and MLB viewed the establishment of the
Office of the Commissioner as the vital component to the solution of that
problem.80 Thus, on January 12, 1921, Kennesaw Mountain Landis became
the first commissioner of MLB, vested with "control over 'whatever and
whoever' had to do with baseball."' 81 After Landis and MLB defined the
standard for commissioner authority, other professional leagues quickly
followed suit. 82
Today, in adherence to the legacy of Landis, the four traditional
professional sports leagues in the United States vest their commissioners with
what is known as "best interests of the sport" authority. 83  Under this
authority, league commissioners have broad discretion84 to discipline
professional athletes for a wide variety of activities, both on and off the field
of play.85 Essentially, any behavior deemed by the commissioner to be
76. Id. at 585.
77. For a discussion of the "Black Sox" scandal, see generally Thomas J. Ostertag, From
Shoeless Joe to Charlie Hustle: Major League Baseball's Continuing Crusade Against Sports
Gambling, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 19 (1992).
78. Dumey, supra note 75, at 583-84. "'[Bleing a true American and being a fan are
synonymous."' Id. at 583 (quoting HAROLD SEYMOUR, 2 BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 5 (1971)).
79. Id. at 583 (quoting SEYMOUR, supra note 78, at 275).
80. Id. at 585.
81. Id. (citing SEYMOUR, supra note 78, at 322).
82. Pollack, supra note 67, at 1645-47. It is important to note that while "best interests
authority" in other sports leagues is similar to that of Baseball's, differences do exist. WEILER &
ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 27.
83. See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 1-86 (discussing commissioner "best
interests" authority in professional sports leagues).
84. For example, in the 1931 case Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Il1. 1931),
the court stated that "[t]he various agreements and rules ... disclose a clear intent upon the part of the
parties to endow the commissioner with all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot and all
the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater familias." Id. at 299. "Broad discretion" to discipline
may in fact be an understatement. For example, see SEYMOUR, supra note 78, at 375, which
discusses MLB Commissioner Landis' lifetime ban of New York Giants outfielder Benny Kauf.
Kauf was banned from the game for life following an indictment on charges of auto theft. Even
following Kauf's subsequent acquittal, Landis refused to reinstate him, stating that allowing him to
return would "burden patrons of the game with grave apprehension as to its integrity." Id.
85. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 1-2.
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detrimental to the image and integrity of the league is subject to discipline. 86
In fact, some commentators have described this authority as "plenary" in
nature.87 An illustration of this belief can be seen in the case Atlanta National
League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, Inc.,88 in which the court declared:
The Commissioner has general authority, without rules or directives,
to punish both clubs and/or personnel for any act or conduct which, in
his judgment, is "not in the best interests of baseball" within the
meaning of the Major League Agreement. What conduct is "not in the
best interests of baseball" is, of course, a question which addresses
itself to the Commissioner, not this court.89
This judicial interpretation of "best interests" authority suggests the extremely
wide degree of latitude commissioners are granted in making disciplinary
determinations. This remarkable deference reflects the judicial inclination to
allow private associations-which traditional professional sports leagues have
been characterized as-to establish and enforce their own rules.90
C. Private Association Law in Professional Sports
As private associations, the limited judicial review afforded to
professional sports league commissioners' "best interests" authority operates
under a "clearly erroneous" standard of review, and courts will not involve
themselves in determining whether a commissioner's decision was "right or
wrong."91 In fact, courts have long declared that "the results of internal
association processes are subject to judicial reversal only if (1) the
association's action adversely affects 'substantial property, contract or other
economic rights' and the association's own internal procedures were
inadequate or unfair, or if (2) the association acted maliciously or in bad
faith."'92 The reason for this deference is relatively simple: courts operate
86. Id. at 1.
87. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 439 (3rd ed. 1997).
88. 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
89. Id. at 1222.
90. See generally Pachman, supra note 67, at 1419-30 (discussing judicial reluctance to intervene
in determinations made by private associations).
91. For example, note the following statement:
We conclude that the evidence fully supports, and we agree with, the district court's finding and
conclusion that the Commissioner "acted in good faith, after investigation, consultation and deliberation,
in a manner which he determined to be in the best interests of baseball" and that "[wlhether he was right
or wrong is beyond the competence and the jurisdiction of this court to decide."
Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7t Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
92. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Brinkworth, 680 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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under the assumption that private associations are more fit to govern their
internal operations than courts.93 According to one commentator,
[i]f a court undertakes to examine the group's rules or past usages, its
inquiry may lead it into.., the "dismal swamp," the area of its
activity concerning which only the group can speak with competence.
Rules and usages which have taken on a peculiar meaning over a
period of time, when interpreted by a court which is unfamiliar with
the group or unsympathetic to its practices, may be construed in a way
which does not reflect the understanding of the members prior to the
dispute. 94
While the courts have traditionally been extremely deferential to
commissioner disciplinary determinations, it is important to note that they will
not hesitate to intervene when there is any indication that a party's due process
rights have been violated.95 Thus, it appears that judicial review of private
association affairs is primarily concerned with process, not merits.
While theoretically possible, it is important to note that very few
challenges to commissioner authority actually make it to the judicial level.
Instead, as one would expect, most are resolved internally. This internal
resolution has had a tremendous impact on a number of professional athletes
over the years. The following section discusses several of the more notable
examples.
V. RECENT EXAMPLES OF COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT RELATED ISSUES
96
Over the years, commissioner "best interests of the game" authority has
generated considerable controversy and media attention in all of the major
professional sports leagues in the United States.97  While general
1996) (quoting Rewolinski v. Fisher, 444 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
93. Finley, 569 F.2d at 539. "Any other conclusion would involve the courts in not only
interpreting often complex rules of baseball to determine if they were violated but also, as noted in the
Landis case, the 'intent of the [baseball] code,' an even more complicated and subjective task." Id.
94. Dumey, supra note 75, at 598 (quoting Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983, 991 (1963)).
95. Pachman, supra note 67, at 1430 n.132 (discussing several examples of caselaw in the world
of sports in which courts insisted that sports organizations provide members with due process of law).
96. A discussion of every instance in which a professional athlete has been disciplined for
behavior thought to be protected by the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this comment. Thus,
this comment will focus on several of the most highly publicized incidents in recent years in the areas
of freedom of speech and freedom of expression.
97. For example, in MLB, recent controversial commissioner disciplinary determinations include
both the Pete Rose and John Rocker incidents. See generally Pachman, supra note 67; Rocker
2003]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
commissioner discipline of athletes has become a widespread practice in
modem professional sports, commissioner discipline for athlete speech and
religious expression has been far less commonplace. Although there has been
a great deal of variety in the First Amendment claims brought by professional
athletes over the years, many of the most highly publicized claims have
involved either freedom of religious expression or freedom of speech. Thus,
the following examples illustrate several of the more notable, recent
developments in the First Amendment rights of professional athletes in these
two contexts.
A. First Amendment Freedom of Religious Expression
"To some extent, claims based on the free exercise of religion overlap
with free speech claims." 98 However, freedom of expression and freedom of
speech claims involve distinct issues. For example, the term "exercise," as
used in this context, encompasses more than simple belief or expression.
Instead, the term "exercise," as used in relation to the first amendment, "often
implies conduct or action."99 Additionally, "the establishment clause has no
parallel in the speech clause. In the religion context ... it places limits on how
far either legislatures or courts can go in exempting religious believers from
general regulations, or otherwise accommodating free exercise values." 100
"Free exercise challenges arise [most] commonly when laws regulate religious
practice or conduct."'' Over the years, freedom of expression claims have
been far less prevalent than freedom of speech claims in professional sports;
however, the most famous freedom of religious expression action initiated by
an athlete is likely legendary boxer Muhammad Ali's battle with the New
York State Athletic Commission.
Arbitration, supra note 13. Latrell Sprewell's attack on his head coach garnered considerable media
attention in the NBA. See generally Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n, On behalf of Player Latrell
Sprewell and Warriors Basketball Club and National Basketball Association, Opinion and Award,
591 PLI/Pat 469 (2000) (Feeric, arb). The.NFL has recently had to deal with the aftermath of the Ray
Lewis incident. See generally Lewis Fined, NFL Levies $250,000 Penalty Against Ravens LB,
CNNSI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/footbalU/nfl/news/2000/08/07/ravensIlewisap/index.
html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002). The NHL had an equally explosive situation on its hands following
the Marty McSorely debacle. See generally Final Sentence, NHL Rules McSorely Can't Play Until
Feb. 20, CNNSI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/hockey/nhl/news/2000/11/07/mcsorely_
suspended ap/index.html (last modified Nov. 7, 2000).
98. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 1444.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1445.
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1. The Muhammad Ali Incident 102
Few, if any, professional athletes have been as controversial, transcending,
and outright important as Muhammad Ali. 103 The controversy surrounding
Ali and Vietnam essentially began on January 24, 1964, the date on which Ali
was ordered to report for a military qualifying examination at the Armed
Forces Induction Center in Florida.104 The military qualifying examination
consisted of two parts: a physical examination and a mental aptitude test. 105
While having no trouble with the physical examination, Ali scored in the
sixteenth percentile on the mental aptitude test, fourteen percentage points
short of the passing grade of thirty. 106
Two years later, as the war effort in Vietnam continued to escalate, 10 7 the
military lowered the minimal percentile score on the mental aptitude test from
thirty to fifteen, effectively making Ali eligible for service. 10 8 Ali, a follower
of the Nation of Islam since 1964, immediately requested that he be exempted
from induction into the military as a conscientious objector to war.109 As a
Muslim, Ali contended that any involvement in Vietnam would violate the
102. The following is a brief summary of the career highlights of Muhammad Ali:
Muhammad Ali (b. Cassius Clay, Jan. 17, 1942): Boxer; 1960 Olympic light heavyweight champion; 3-
time world heavyweight champ (1964-67, 1974-78, 1978-79); defeated Sonny Liston (1964), George
Foreman (1974) and Leon Spinks (1978) for title; fought Joe Frazier in 3 memorable bouts (1971-75),
winning twice; adopted Black Muslim faith in 1964 and changed name; stripped of title in 1967 after
conviction for refusing induction into U.S. Army; verdict reversed by Supreme Court in 1971; career
record of 56-5 with 37 KO's and 19 successful title defenses; lit the flaming cauldron to signal the
beginning of the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.
ESPN, INFORMATION PLEASE SPORTS ALMANAC 514 (Gerry Brown & Michael Morrison eds., 2002)
[hereinafter ESPN ALMANAC].
103. See generally Joyce Carol Oates, Muhammad Ali: The Greatest Second Act, in ESPN,
SPORTSCENTURY 207 (Michael MacCambridge ed., 1999) "He was a force, not only in sports and
popular culture, but in American intellectual life, where, a decade after his famous stance against the
Vietnam War, he remained a galvanizing, electrifying figure that proved ceaselessly fascinating to the
American literati." Id. According to sportswriter Larry Schwartz:
Sports is filled with showmen, and with great athletes, but perhaps never were they better combined than
in the young man who began life as Cassius Clay and became a worldwide phenomenon as Muhammad
Ali. The man... went from being a curious oddity in the early 1960s to a national villain to an
international hero. And now he reigns as one of the most beloved men on the planet.
Larry Schwartz, Sportscentury Biography: He is Simply... The Greatest, ESPN.COM, http://
espn.go.com/classic/biography/s/AliMuhammad.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
104. THOMAS HAUSER, MUHAMMAD ALI: HIs LIFE AND TIMES 142 (Simon & Schuster 1991).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 142-43.
107. Id. at 144.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 154.
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rules of his faith.110 This decision alienated Ali from a number of Americans
and caused him to become "one of the most despised public figures in
America."1 11
While a Kentucky Appeal Board granted Ali's conscientious objector
request, "the National Selective Service Presidential Appeal Board voted
unanimously to maintain Ali's 1-A classification" 112 following FBI and
Department of Justice intervention into the matter.113 Following the decision
of the National Selective Service Presidential Appeal Board, Ali was to be
inducted into the United States Military on April 28, 1967.114 However, on
that date, the name "Cassius Marcellus Clay" 115 was called four times, and
four times Ali refused to step forward. 116 Thus, later that same day, the World
110. Id. at 166.
111. Oates, supra note 103, at 209; Schwartz, supra note 103 (noting that following Ali's
decision to join the Nation of Islam, his "popularity nose-dived"). "'If you had told somebody in
1968 that in 1996 Muhammad Ali would be the most beloved individual on earth, and the mere sight
of him holding an Olympic torch would bring him to tears, you'd have won a lot of bets."' Schwartz,
supra note 103 (quoting Bryant Gumbel).
112. HAUSER, supra note 104, at 166.
113. Id. Throughout the course of his refusal to enlist, Ali made a number of memorable
comments. Perhaps most famously, Ali was quoted as saying, "Man, I ain't got no quarrel with them
Vietcong." Id. "No Vietcong ever called me nigger." Oates, supra note 103, at 210. A short time
later, Ali elaborated on these profound and controversial statements by saying:
Why should they ask me... to put on a uniform and go ten thousand miles from home and drop bombs
and bullets on brown people in Vietnam while so-called Negro people in Louisville are treated like dogs?
If I thought going to war would bring freedom and equality to twenty-two million of my people, they
wouldn't have to draft me; I'd join tomorrow. But I either have to obey the laws of the land or the laws
of Allah. I have nothing to lose by standing up and following my beliefs. So I'll go to jail. We've been
in jail for four hundred years.
HAUSER, supra note 104, at 167.
114 HAUSER, supra note 104, at 166. In opposing the determination of the Appeal Board, the
Department of Justice wrote a letter to the Appeal Board, stating that based upon its examination of
the FBI's investigation of Ali, it appeared "that Ali's objection to war rested on political and racial
rather than religious grounds, that he was opposed only to certain types of war, and that his beliefs
were a matter of convenience rather than sincerely held." Id. at 155.
115. Much to Ali's dismay, even after he had legally changed his name from Cassius Marcellus
Clay-a name he characterized as his "slave name"-to Muhammad Ali in 1964, "the majority of
white publications, including even The New York Times, as well as television commentators,
refused... to acknowledge Ali's new, legal name." Oates, supra note 103, at 212.
116. HAUSER, supra note 104, at 169. Following the induction ceremony, Ali issued the
following statement:
I am proud of the title "World Heavyweight Champion," which I won in the ring in Miami on February
25, 1964. The holder of it should at all times have the courage of his convictions and carry out those
convictions, not only in the ring but throughout all phases of his life. It is in light of my own personal
convictions that I take my stand in rejecting the call to be inducted into the armed services. I do so with
full realization of its implications and possible consequences. I have searched my conscience, and find I
cannot be true to my belief in my religion by accepting such a call. My decision is a private and
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Boxing Association and the "New York State Athletic Commission [a
governing body analogous to the commissioner's office] suspended [Ali's]
boxing license and stripped him of his title," 117 stating that Ali's "refusal to
enter the service and [his] felony conviction in violation of federal law is
regarded by this Commission to be detrimental to the best interests of boxing,
or to the public interest, convenience or necessity." 1 8 Shortly after the New
York State Athletic Commission announced its decision to strip Ali of his state
boxing license, all other United States jurisdictions followed suit.119
Following the revocation of his boxing license and World Heavyweight Title,
Ali filed lawsuit after lawsuit against the myriad of state boxing
commissions 120 that had denied him the right to participate in the sport he
loved.
In his lawsuit against the New York State Athletic Commission, which
was decided under the Fourteenth Amendment, Ali claimed that the
Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking his boxing
license due to the fact that other boxers who had been convicted of similar
and, in many cases, much more heinous crimes were allowed to continue to
box. 12
1
In essence, Ali's claim was a private association law challenge to the New
York State Athletic Commission's "best interests" authority. 122 After initially
rejecting Ali's claim, the court subsequently reversed, and forced the Athletic
individual one. In taking it I am dependent solely upon Allah as the final judge of these actions brought
about by my own conscience. I strongly object to the fact that so many newspapers have given the
American public and the world the impression that I have only two alternatives in taking this stand-
either I go to jail or go to the Army. There is another alternative, and that alternative is justice. If justice
prevails, if my constitutional rights are upheld, I will be forced to go neither to the Army norjail. In the
end, I am confident that justice will come my way, for the truth must eventually prevail.
Id. at 170.
117. Schwartz, supra note 103.
118. Ali v. State Athletic Comm'n ofN. Y., 316 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis
added).
119. HAUSER, supra note 104, at 172. Additionally, the United States government revoked Ali's
passport to prevent him from boxing overseas. Id. at 181. This decision precluded Ali from boxing
anywhere for a period of three years. Id. at 202.
120. See generally Al, 308 F. Supp. at 19 (noting the court's denial of Ali's motion for
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the New York State Boxing Commission's decision to
suspend Ali's boxing license following his conviction for draft evasion was irrational and
unsupported by evidence); Ali, 316 F. Supp. at 1252-53 (noting the court's reversal of its earlier
decision upholding the New York State Boxing Commission's decision to revoke Ali's license on the
grounds that the Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously).
121. Ali, 316 F. Supp. at 1250-53.
122. Id. at 1247-48.
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Commission to reinstate Ali's license. 123 According to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York:
Although the state possesses broad powers to regulate boxing,
however, it may not exercise those powers in such a way as to deny to
an applicant the equal protection of the state's laws, which is
guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. A deliberate and
arbitrary discrimination or inequality in the exercise of regulatory
power, not based upon differences that are reasonably related to the
lawful purposes of such regulation, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. 124
The district court concluded that while Ali may not have had constitutional
protection for his actions due to the New York State Athletic Commission's
private actor status, he should at the least have legal protection from arbitrary
and capricious behavior under private association law. 125 Subsequently, this
decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, which concluded
that "it is indisputably clear.., that the Department was simply wrong as a
matter of law .... "126 Thus, nearly three and one-half years after he was
denied the right to earn his living in the ring, Ali was finally allowed to fight
to regain the title that had been so ruthlessly stripped from him.127
123. Id. at 1253.
124. Id. at 1250 (citations omitted).
125. According to the district court:
In short, the exercise of state power by a state agency in the issuance or refusal of licenses to engage in a
regulated activity should not represent the exercise of mere personal whim, caprice or prejudice on the
part of such agency .... If the Commission in the present case had denied licenses to all applicants
convicted of crimes or military offenses, plaintiff would have no valid basis for demanding that a license
be issued to him. But the action of the Commission in denying him a license because of his refusal to
serve in the Armed Forces while granting licenses to hundreds of other applicants convicted of other
crimes and military offenses involving moral turpitude appears on its face to be an intentional, arbitrary
and unreasonable discrimination against plaintiff... It is not suggested that any rational basis exists for
singling out the offense of draft evasion for labeling as "conduct detrimental to the interests of boxing"
while holding that all other criminal activities such as murder, rape, arson, burglary, robbery and
possession of narcotics are not so classified. All other things being equal, the convicted murderer,
burglar, rapist, or robber would seem to present a greater risk of corruptibility as a licensed boxer, and a
greater likelihood of bringing boxing into disrepute, than would the person who openly refused to serve in
the Armed Forces.
Id. at 1250-51 (citations omitted).
126. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 704 (1971).
127. HAUSER, supra note 104, at 202.
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2. The Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf Incident 128
In 1996, Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf was arguably having the best year of his
career as a shooting guard for the NBA's Denver Nuggets, averaging 19.2
points per game. 129 Five years earlier, Abdul-Rauf, then known as Chris
Jackson, had become a follower of the Muslim religion. 130 In the years
between 1991 and 1996, Abdul-Rauf became increasingly devoted to his faith,
while at the same time becoming more and more dissatisfied with United
States foreign policy, most notably its involvement in the Gulf War.131
According to Abdul-Rauf, who had described himself as "[f]irst, foremost and
last... a Muslim,"' 32 the American flag had become "a symbol of
oppression ... [and] tyranny."'133 Thus, after coming to the conclusion that he
"[could not] be for God and for oppression," Abdul-Rauf vowed that he would
never again stand for the playing of the national anthem that precedes every
NBA game. 134
This controversial decision put Abdul-Rauf in violation of an NBA rule
dating back to World War II that required players to stand "respectfully"
during the playing of the national anthem. 135 Initially, the Nuggets, with the
consent of the NBA, allowed Abdul-Rauf to return to the locker room during
the playing of the national anthem so as to be out of the view of the fans in
128. "Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf, formerly known as Chris Jackson... played college basketball at
Louisiana State University. He was selected third in the 1990 NBA draft by the Denver Nuggets ....
Abdul-Rauf won the NBA's Most Improved Player award in 1993." Koenig, supra note 13, at 377-
78 n.4 (citing John Mossman, Islam Dominates Life, Career of Abdul-Rauf BATON ROUGE ADVOC.,
Mar. 15, 1996, at 9D). Following the 1996 season, Denver traded Abdul-Rauf to the Sacramento
Kings. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 77.
129. Player Profile: Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf NBA.COM,
http://www.nba.com/playerfile/mahmoudabdul-rauf/ca (last visited Mar. 18, 2002) (noting Abdul-
Rauf's career statistics in the NBA).
130. Koenig, supra note 13, at 377-78 (citing Mossman, supra note 128).
131. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 76.
132. Donna Carter, Abdul-Rauf Has New Song: R-e-s-p-e-c-t, DENVER POST, Apr. 23, 1996, at
D1. Abdul-Rauf also declared that .'[m]y beliefs are more important than anything .... If I have to
give up basketball, I will."' Rosco Nance, Abdul-Rauf Suspended Over Anthem, USA TODAY, Mar.
13, 1996, at 1C.
133. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 76. Additionally, Abdul-Rauf stated "'I just don't
look at Muslim issues, I look at Caucasian America and I look at the African-American being
oppressed in this country... [a]nd I don't stand for that. I'll never stand for that."' Dave Krieger,
Abdul Rauf Vows to Fight Suspension, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 13, 1996, at 4A.
134. WElLER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 76. Abdul-Rauf became the first professional athlete
to refuse to stand for the playing of the National Anthem. Manny Topol, Legal Issues
Cloudy/Contract Law or Religion? NEWSDAY, Mar. 14, 1996, at A95.
135. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 76.
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attendance. 136 As time passed, however, Abdul-Rauf began to display his
opposition publicly by remaining on the bench or stretching directly in front of
it during the national anthem. 137 In response, NBA Commissioner David
Stem announced that Abdul-Rauf would be suspended without pay until he
was willing to comply with the league rule. 138 Stem based his decision to
suspend Abdul-Rauf on a provision contained within the NBA's CBA that
allowed the commissioner to "discipline players who are 'guilty of conduct
prejudicial or detrimental' to the NBA.' 139
Both Abdul-Rauf's action and Commissioner Stem's reaction generated a
swarm of media attention. While many found Abdul-Rauf's refusal to stand
for the national anthem offensive, 140 others believed that Stem's decision had
violated Abdul-Rauf's First Amendment and Title VII rights. 141 In fact, the
National Basketball Players Association went so far as to offer filing a
grievance against the NBA on Abdul-Rauf's behalf, 142 an offer that Abdul-
Rauf ultimately rejected.
After the initial one-game suspension, Abdul-Rauf decided that he would
be willing to stand for the playing of the national anthem, provided that he
could "stand... with his eyes closed, his hands cupped close to his face, and
praying to Allah." 143 Stem found this proposal satisfactory, and agreed to lift
Abdul-Rauf's suspension.144 Following Stem's reinstatement of Abdul-Rauf,
the matter was settled without lawsuit or arbitration.
B. First Amendment Freedom of Speech




139. Id. at 77.
140. Roscoe Nance, Beliefs Clash With Career: Religion's Reason He Won't Rise for Anthem,
USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 1996, at 3C (noting that following Abdul-Rauf's suspension, hundreds of
Nuggets fans threatened to either boycott games or cancel their season ticket packages as long as
Abdul-Rauf was permitted to remain with the team).
141. As was previously discussed, because the NBA has been characterized as a "private actor,"
any First Amendment claim filed by Abdul-Rauf would have been inapplicable. However, some legal
precedent suggests that Abdul-Rauf may have been able to successfully assert a Title VII claim
against the NBA. See generally Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)
(discussing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).





from freedom of expression claims. 145 While freedom of expression claims
involve conduct or action, freedom of speech claims refer to simply that: pure
speech in and of itself. 146 In the following examples, the athletes involved
were punished by their respective leagues, not for anything relating to the
exercise of their religion, but rather for statements made both on and off the
field of play.
1. The John Rocker Incident 147
Few events in recent sports history have generated as much media
attention as former Atlanta Braves pitcher John Rocker's infamous comments
made in a 1999 interview with the sports magazine SPORTS ILLUSTRATED. 148
In the months preceding the interview, the volatile Rocker had developed an
intense relationship with fans of the Braves principal rival at the time, the New
York Mets. 149 This relationship stemmed largely from several exchanges of
profanity and obscene gestures made between Rocker and Mets fans in a late-
season series at Shea Stadium in New York, and reached its boiling point in a
post-season match-up between the same two clubs shortly thereafter. 150
The situation that had erupted between Rocker and Mets fans generated a
great deal of publicity for Rocker, and following the conclusion of the 1999
season, he agreed to be interviewed by SPORTS ILLUSTRATED writer Jeff
Pearlman. 151 Throughout the course of the interview, Rocker made a number
of "'profoundly insensitive and arguably racist statements.' 152 Among other
things, Rocker referred to "an overweight black teammate [as] 'a fat
145. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 1444.
146. Id. For a more thorough discussion of First Amendment freedom of speech law, see supra
notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
147. John Rocker was born October 17, 1974 in Statesboro, Georgia. Players: John Rocker,
CNNSI.CoM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/players/14846/index.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2003). Rocker first entered Major League Baseball as a relief pitcher for the Atlanta Braves in
1998. Id. After three and one-half solid seasons with the Braves, Rocker was traded to the Cleveland
Indians during the 2001 season. See id. Following a sub-par stint in Cleveland, Rocker found his way
to Texas in the 2001-2002 off-season, where he pitched as a member of the Texas Rangers. See id.
Rocker was released by Texas following the season and signed to a minor league contract by the
Tampa Bay Devil Rays in April 2003. Devil Rays Sign Rocker, Assign Him to Durham Bulls, USA
TODAY, Apr. 10, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/al/devilrays/2003 
-04-10-
rocker x.htm.
148. Pearlman, supra note 13.
149. Rocker Arbitration, supra note 13, at 772-73.
150. Id. (noting the melee that occurred during these two series).
151. Id. at 773; see generally Pearlman, supra note 13.
152. Rocker Arbitration, supra note 13, at 769 (quoting Allan H. "Bud" Selig, Commissioner of
Major League Baseball).
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monkey," ' 153 characterized Japanese women as bad drivers, 154 expressed a
dislike for what he referred to as "foreigners," 155 and when asked about the
possibility of ever playing for a New York team responded:
I would retire first. It's the most hectic, nerve-racking city. Imagine
having to take the [Number] 7 train to the ballpark, looking like you're
[riding through] Beirut next to some kid with purple hair next to some
queer with AIDS right next to some dude who just got out of jail for
the fourth time right next to some 20-year-old mom with four kids.
It's depressing.156
As one may expect, the nation exploded following the publication of
Pearlman's article.' 5 7 Many people were upset about Rocker's comments, 158
including MLB Commissioner Alan H. "Bud" Selig. 159 In a news release
announcing the discipline to be imposed on Rocker, Selig stated:
Major League Baseball takes seriously its role as an American
institution and the important social responsibility that goes with it...
We will not dodge our responsibility. Mr. Rocker should understand
that his remarks offended practically every element of society and
brought dishonor to himself, the Atlanta Braves and Major League
Baseball.
The terrible example set by Mr. Rocker is not what our great game is
about and, in fact, is a profound breach of the social compact we hold
in such high regard.160
Based upon these observations, Selig, who characterized Rocker's remarks as
153. Id. at 775.
154. Pearlman, supra note 13.
155. Id.
156. Id.(quoting John Rocker).
157. Rocker Arbitration, supra note 13, at 774.
158. For example, consider the following:
On January 5, 2000 the Atlanta City Council unanimously adopted a resolution condemning Rocker's
remarks. A coalition of community organizations, many representing groups that were maligned by
Rocker's remarks, as well as other individuals (including Jesse Jackson) and groups, demanded swift and
decisive action by the Braves and the Commissioner. The Commissioner received literally thousands of
communications condemning and, in some instances, defending Rocker's remarks. Many of these
communications, while disapproving of Rocker's words, opposed disciplining him on free speech
grounds.
Id. at 777-78.
159. Rocker Arbitration, supra note 13, at 769.
160. Id. at 777.
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"hate speech"' 6 1 (the actual accuracy of this characterization is highly
contestable), used his "best interests" authority to suspend Rocker for seventy-
three days without pay, 162 ordered him to make a $20,000 donation to "the
NAACP or a similar organization dedicated to the goals of diversity," and
instructed him to enroll in a diversity training program prior to his return to
MLB. 16
3
As was the case with Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf, even should he have desired
to, Rocker would have been barred from filing constitutional claims against
MLB due to its private actor status. 164 However, Rocker and the Major
League Baseball Player's Association (MLBPA) wasted little time in filing a
Notice of Grievance against MLB, contending that Selig's punishment was
without "just cause" in violation of Article XII(A) of the Major League
Agreement. 165 Specifically, the union presented the arbitrator with two main
grievances directed at the punishment Selig had imposed upon Rocker: First,
the union "argued that the penalty was too great when compared with past
disciplines by the commissioner's office;"' 166  and second, the union
"maintained that speech-even if it's offensive-shouldn't be grounds for
punishment."' 167
The arbitration proceeding that followed the filing of Rocker's grievance
proved to have mixed results for Selig. While the arbitrator ultimately
vindicated Selig's authority to discipline an athlete for speech-related, off-
season conduct, he also significantly reduced the original punishment Selig
had imposed upon Rocker. 168 According to the arbitrator, Selig's desired
punishment of Rocker vastly exceeded past disciplinary actions taken by the
161. Id. at 778.
162. Shropshire, supra note 3.
163. Rocker Arbitration, supra note 13, at 770.
164. Mel Antonen, Law Doesn't Bar Selig From Action, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2000, at 3C ("For
200 years, courts have interpreted the First Amendment to say that the government can't stop Rocker
from shooting off his mouth, but Rocker can't use it as a protection from punishment by the private
sector.").
165. Rocker Arbitration, supra note 13, at 769.
166. Larry Whiteside, Baseball's Very Sorry Situation: Rocker's Suspension Reduced, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2000, at C1.
167. Arbitrator's Decision Favors Controversial Baseball Player, 55 DISP. RESOL. J. 6 (May
2000).
168. To the dismay of many, including Selig, Rocker's fine of $20,000 was reduced to a paltry
$500 and his original seventy-three game suspension was reduced to fourteen. Whiteside, supra note
166. In a prepared statement in response to the arbitrator's decision, Selig was quoted as saying: "'I
disagree with the decision .... It does not reflect any understanding or sensitivity to the important
social responsibility that baseball ... has to be [sic] the public. It completely ignores the sensibilities
of those groups of people maligned by Mr. Rocker and disregards the player's position as a role
model for children."' Id.
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league, and thus could not stand. 169 Following the decision of the arbitrator,
both Rocker and Selig decided to drop the matter, but the American public and
media have yet to do the same. 170
It appears that the Rocker arbitration illustrates two important points for
purposes of this comment. First, and perhaps foremost, the arbitrator's
decision vindicated a commissioner's authority to discipline an athlete for
speech-related issues, even should they occur in the off-season. Second, the
Rocker proceeding illustrates that while examples are few and far between,
there are in fact limits on commissioner "best interests" authority.
2. The Dennis Rodman Incident 171
Former NBA superstar Dennis Rodman has had an illustrious history of
controversial behavior. 172 As a colorful forward for the Detroit Pistons, San
Antonio Spurs, Chicago Bulls, Los Angeles Lakers, and Dallas Mavericks,
Rodman has remained in the public spotlight for the better part of the past ten
years. Throughout the course of his career, Rodman had a number of run-ins
with NBA Commissioner David Stem. However, the most controversial of
them all may have occurred during the 1997 NBA post-season.
Following Game Three of the 1997 NBA Finals against the Utah Jazz at
the Delta Center in Salt Lake City, Utah, a game in which he had been
incessantly heckled by the Jazz faithful, Rodman told a reporter that he
thought Mormons were "assholes." 173  In response to this remark, NBA
169. Id
170. Rocker Has Until Next Week to Report to Redhawks, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/0418/1370711 .html (last visited Apr. 18, 2002) (illustrating
that even two years after the incident, the media is still discussing the SPORTS ILLUSTRATED article).
171. The following is a brief summary of the career highlights and lowlights of Dennis Rodman:
Dennis Rodman (b. May 13, 1961): Basketball F; superb rebounder and defender; also known for dyeing
his hair various colors and for getting suspended regularly; in 1997, he was suspended for 11 games for
kicking a courtside cameraman; led NBA in rebounding 7 years in a row (1992-1998); member of 5 NBA
champion teams with Detroit (1989,90) and Chicago (1996-98); 2-time All Star (1990, 92), 2-time
defensive player of the year (1990-91) and 6-time member of the NBA All-Defensive team (1989-93,
96).
ESPN ALMANAC, supra note 102, at 537.
172. For several recent descriptions of Rodman's behavior, see generally Mark Bechtel, Year of
the Worm: Has Any Other Player had an NBA Season as Bizarre as the One Dennis Rodman Just
Went Through? Don't Be Ridiculous, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 25, 1997, at 36; E. Jean Carroll,
The Bad Boy Diary, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 31, 1997; Richard Hoffer, A Funny Thing Happened
on the Way to the Forum: With the Arrival of the Flamboyant Dennis Rodman, Lakers Fans
Expecting a Sideshow Were Treated to Something Else: A Rousing Revival Of Showtime, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 8, 1999, at 38; Michael Silver, Rodman Unchained, The Spurs 'No-Holds-Barred
Forward Gives New Meaning to the Running Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 29, 1995, at 20.
173. Carl's Jr. to Drop Rodman Ads Following Anti-Mormon Slams, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
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Commissioner David Stem imposed a $50,000 fine on Rodman, which at that
point in time was the largest fine that had ever been imposed upon an NBA
player. 174 In a press release issued by the NBA following the announcement
of the fine, Stem commented that "insensitive or derogatory comments
involving race or other classifications are unacceptable in the NBA .... ,175
Like Abdul-Rauf, Rodman ultimately decided not to challenge Stem's
authority. Instead, he simply issued a tearful public apology and paid the
fine. 176 Thus, the incident faded into obscurity with little press or fanfare.
VI. PROPOSAL: RESHAPING LEAGUE CONSTITUTIONS AND CBAS
As was previously discussed, professional athletes are bound by the terms
of league constitutions through standard player contracts and league CBAs.177
Because league constitutions and standard player contracts bind professional
athletes to commissioners' "best interest authority," in order to effectuate any
sort of change, league constitutions must be amended. The best avenue of
bringing about this change is the collective bargaining process.
A. Differentiating Professional Athletes from the Average Private Sector
Employee
As the aforementioned examples acutely illustrate, professional athletes
face a very substantial risk of being punished for engaging in behavior largely
protected in other fields of employment. While it may indeed be true that
many employees in the private sector face similar First Amendment hardships,
being employed by a professional sports team presents athletes with situations
substantially dissimilar than those faced by the average private sector
employee.
First and foremost, professional athletes are constantly subjected to
immense media scrutiny, a situation unimaginable to the vast majority of
traditional private sector employees. While many athletes do indeed make the
conscious decision to thrust themselves into the media spotlight, others are
pulled in unwillingly. 178 Additionally, professional athletes are constantly
June 15, 1997, at 14.
174. Terry Armour, Rodman Must Tithe $50,00for Insult, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1997, at IN.
175. Slezak, supra note 13.
176. Larry Stewart, Schenkel, Not Olberman, Bowled Over, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1997, at C6.
177. See supra notes 62-95 and accompanying text.
178. For example, many fans of Major League Baseball will recall Mark McGwire's struggle
with the media during his record-setting season in 1998. Barry Bonds faced similar media scrutiny
during his record-breaking 2001 season.
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asked for their opinions on various political and social issues, 179 commissioner
decisions, managerial decisions, coaching decisions, league officiating, and a
number of other issues. It seems fairly safe to assume that these sorts of
situations are not often faced by the average private sector employee. While
private sector employees undoubtedly discuss office politics, the media is not
there to record and rebroadcast every word said. Due to these sorts of intense
media pressures, it should come as no surprise that a number of professional
athletes have made controversial comments over the years.
Another important distinction between private sector employees and
professional athletes is the fact that offensive speech or bigotry in a typical
office setting creates the potential for vastly greater harms than can be
experienced in the world of professional sports. For example, recently
"[e]xecutives at the Texaco Corporation were heavily fined for making
insensitive statements in the course of office banter," 180 and Marge Schott,
former owner of the Cincinnati Reds, was suspended by MLB for racially
insensitive speech in the early 1990s. 181 The ramifications of offensive
speech in managerial situations, such as the two just mentioned, are vastly
more grave than comments made by a professional athlete such as John
Rocker. The reason for this conclusion is simple:
Both Schott and the Texaco executives were in management positions,
where their beliefs and thoughts were likely to have a direct impact on
their actions, such as in hiring practices. Rocker is merely a relief
pitcher; his decision to be a bigot, while violating nearly everyone's
sense of right and wrong, does not violate anyone's rights.
As offensive as it may be, Rocker is allowed to hate whomever he
wants, provided he does no more than hate. 182
As one can see, the free speech harms caused by individual athletes such as
Rocker are simply not tantamount to free speech harms caused by those in a
traditional corporate setting.
As was previously seen, the government has no legitimate authority to
179. For example, during the course of the Vietnam War, Muhammad Ali was asked the
following questions, among others: "How do you feel about the war in Vietnam?" "Do you know
where Vietnam is?" "Is the war a just war?" "What do you think about the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution?" "What do you think about Lyndon Johnson?" "Could you kill a Vietcong?" "What if the
Vietcong try to kill you?" HAUSER, supra note 104, at 144. For a more recent example, see Mark
Kreidler, They're Athletes Not Rocket Scientists, ESPN.COM,
http://espn.go.com/columns/kreidlermark/1426777.html (Sept. 3, 2002).
180. Tim Sullivan, Rocker's Punishment: A First Amendment Wrong, THE HOYA, Feb. 4, 2000,





proscribe speech that is merely controversial in nature. Thus, under current
Supreme Court jurisprudence, it does not appear that any of the examples
discussed in Part V would fall into any of the current judicially-carved
exceptions to First Amendment protection. 183 This inconsistency has created
the interesting anomaly that while courts have refused to proscribe speech or
expression solely on the basis of its offensiveness, 184 professional sports
leagues (and too a lesser degree traditional workplaces) seem to have no
reservations about doing so. While the social utility of many of the comments
previously mentioned is debatable, their contribution to the time-honored
tradition of the "marketplace of ideas"'185 is no different than that of any other
comment.
Unfortunately, as was previously discussed, potential avenues of redress
for professional athletes seeking First Amendment vindication appear
extremely limited. Recent Supreme Court decisions reflect the idea that the
current makeup of the Court abhors any further extension of state actor
status. 186 Thus, as the law currently stands, it appears unlikely that athletes
will be able to assert First Amendment claims against professional sports
leagues due to their private actor status. 187  Additionally, as the
aforementioned examples demonstrate, reliance on private association law has
not proved to be an adequate remedy for professional athletes either. 188 While
it is true that Muhammad Ali was eventually able to win a private association
claim against a league governing body, that appears to be the exception rather
183. As the state of the law currently stands, the Supreme Court has announced the following
categories of speech/expression as falling outside of the protection granted by the First Amendment:
(1) incitement; (2) fighting words; (3) libel/defamation; (4) obscenity; (5) child pornography; and, in
certain circumstances, (6) commercial speech. For a thorough discussion on these exceptions, see
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 956-1153.
184. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that government may not
proscribe speech based solely on its content, regardless of the specific manner in which it is
expressed).
185. The "marketplace of ideas" concept was first proposed by philosopher John Stuart Mill. See
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 959-60.
Mill's central argument was that the suppression of opinion is wrong, whether or not the opinion is true: if
it is true, society is denied the truth; if it is false, society is denied the fuller understanding of truth which
comes from its conflict with error; and when the received opinion is part truth and part error, society can
know the whole truth only by allowing the airing of competing views.
Id.
186. See generally Jackson, 419 U.S. 345.
187. See Antonen, supra note 164 and accompanying text.
188. While it is true that Muhammad Ali was eventually able to win his dispute with the New
York State Athletic Commission, other professional athletes have not shared this same success. See
supra notes 96-176 and accompanying text.
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than the rule. 189
However, while courts may continue to be reluctant to grant professional
sports league employees constitutional protections, there does not appear to be
any legal barriers to leagues taking the matter into their own hands. Other
potential means of securing First Amendment protection may be available to
professional athletes, namely through the restructuring of league constitutions
and CBAs.190
B. Professional Sports League Labor Unions
Professional sports league employees, much like other employees in the
private sector, often rely on labor unions to protect and advance their rights
and interests. Unfortunately, in order to gain union protection, employees
must make certain sacrifices. For example, in order to join labor unions,
employees are often required to forfeit many of their individual avenues of
redress for grievances they may potentially have against an employer. 191 In
recognition of these sorts of sacrifices, the National Labor Relations Act
imposes a duty of fair representation on labor unions. 192 Under this duty,
unions, acting as agents of their members, are required to collectively
represent the interests of any and all members. 193 Based upon this premise, if
professional athletes are to acquire increased First Amendment protection
from leagues, unions must be the catalyst in bringing about this change. 194
Past union efforts to secure increased rights for members have proved
quite successful, especially when related to mandatory subjects of collective
189. See supra notes 102-127 and accompanying text.
190. For example, Rule 27 of the Major League Agreement states that the Agreement may be
amended provided that three-fourths of the members of the National Association approve the
amendment. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, supra note 68, at Rule 27. With the exception of the
three-fourths requirement, the Major League Agreement does not set any limits on substantive
changes may be made to the Agreement. Thus, it appears safe to say provided the votes, there are no
barriers to the addition of increased First Amendment rights for professional athletes.
191. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253-54 (9t' Cir. 1985) (describing the theory behind
union representation). While professional sports league players have in fact been contractually
required to forfeit their access to the judicial system, the success of these contractual requirements is
debatable. For example, Latrell Sprewell was able to file a district court claim against the NBA and
the Golden State Warriors for the punishment imposed on him following his 1997 run-in with coach
P.J. Carlesimo. See generally Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9t , Cir. 2000);
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 231 F.3d 520 (9"t Cir. 2000).
192. Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1253; see also Durney, supra note 75, at 581.
193. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 311 (discussing a union's duty of fair
representation).
194. CHAMPION, JR., supra note 70, at 44-45. "The process of collective bargaining only works
because of the threat of concerted action that each party can legally invoke if negotiation reaches an
impasse." Id. at 45.
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bargaining. 195 For example, in 1976, the MLBPA helped to topple the reserve
clause system that had crippled player salary levels for nearly thirty years. 196
While the initial jab to the reserve clause was dealt by an arbitration
proceeding, the blow that finally produced significant change in the free-agent
system was dealt by the collective bargaining sessions that followed the
arbitrator's decision. 197  Another example of the power of collective
bargaining in MLB was the union's successful efforts at gaining "certain
arbitration rights with regard to discipline imposed upon them by their club,
the league, or the Commissioner." 198 Unfortunately, "[t]he matters subject to
arbitration... do not include matters 'involving the preservation of the
integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in' baseball."' 199
Nonetheless, this example illustrates that change is indeed possible, and there
is no reason to believe that further collective bargaining could not further
extend the reach of arbitration proceedings in MLB. Union grievances in
other sports over the years have also proved successful. 200
In addition to collective bargaining, a wide variety of economic weapons,
including strikes, pickets, and boycotts, are at the disposal of unions to aid in
exerting pressure on leagues. 20 1 The use of such economic weapons has
proved quite advantageous to union positions in the past.20 2 For example, in
195. As was briefly mentioned earlier in this comment, "terms and conditions of employment"
are regarded as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Id. at 44. Under federal labor law,
unions have the right to insist on negotiating mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Id.
196. See generally Nat'l & Am. League Prof I Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n (Messersmith & McNally Grievances), 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1976) (Seitz, Miller, &
Gaherin, Arbs.).
197. According to one commentator:
As the Messersmith decision was being rendered... the baseball collective agreement was itself expiring
and being renegotiated. Naturally enough, free agency became the central issue in these negotiations.
After a 17-day owner lockout of the players during spring training.., the Players Association and the
owners' Player Relations Committee reached a new collective agreement .... The new contract modified
free agency considerably.
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 248.
198. Durney, supra note 75, at 581 n.6.
199. Id. (quoting BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION art. XI, pt. A, § 1(b) (1990)).
200. For one such example, see generally Nordstrom v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 292
N.L.R.B. No. 110, 1988-89 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 28,841 (Feb. 8, 1989) (illustrating a professional
sports union's ability to enforce the rights of its members in the face of alleged team disciplinary
action).
201. YASSER ET AL., supra note 71, at 430-31.
202. The author of this comment is not necessarily agreeing or disagreeing with union tactics
employed by either side in the 1994 Major League Baseball strike. The example is merely used as an
illustration of the power unions can exert over leagues in professional sports. See WEILER &
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1994, the MLBPA and team owners became embroiled in a bitter dispute over
the possibility of team salary caps.203 Citing the fact that average baseball
salaries had increased 600% from 1981 to 1994, owners advocated the
imposition of a hard salary cap to help alleviate their alleged economic
hardships, an idea the Players Association was steadfastly against. 20 4 After
collective bargaining failed to provide a satisfactory remedy, the MLBPA
decided to strike.20 5 While the strike had devastating effects on the popularity
of the game of baseball, it proved successful from the union's vantage point in
the sense that MLB is still the only major professional sport in the United
States without some form of salary cap.206 Thus, for many, the 1994 strike
serves as an unfortunate reminder of the tremendous pressure unions can exert
on leagues to force them to succumb to union demands.
As the previous examples illustrate, professional sports league unions do
indeed have the power to secure increased rights for their members. Based
upon the "give-and-take" 20 7 nature of the collective bargaining process, it
seems probable that given the right concessions (or pressures), leagues may
agree to afford professional athletes with increased First Amendment
protection. At the least, it would seem perfectly reasonable to amend league
constitutions and CBAs to contain "First Amendment-like" rights. For
example, league constitutions could contain provisions requiring
commissioners to consider First Amendment jurisprudence when dealing with
free speech and religious expression-related issues. A more workable solution
may require league commissioners to be bound by private association law in
the same manner that the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York held the New York State Athletic Commission to be in the Ali
case. 20 8 The Ali decision seemed to strike a balance between the governing
body's legitimate interests in protecting the "best interests" of its sport and the
professional athlete's interest in not being treated arbitrarily or capriciously. 20 9
Additionally, in evaluating the legality of commissioner disciplinary
determinations, arbitrators could be required to apply the framework provided
by current First Amendment precedent. In the past, arbitrators have applied a
wide variety of legal principles to sports-related disputes, from traces of
ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 290-95 (discussing the effects of the 1987 NFL player strike).




207. CHAMPION, JR., supra note 70, at 44.




federal labor and antitrust law210 to the New York Code of Professional
Responsibility.211 Thus, there is no reason to believe that the same could not
be done with First Amendment law. Applying these sorts of procedural
safeguards to professional sports league disciplinary determinations should
help to strike a compromise between the competing interests of league
commissioners in protecting the best interests of their sport and players in
protecting their First Amendment rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
Due to their high-profile status, professional athletes are often times
subject to media pressures unimaginable to the average private sector
employee. These sorts of pressures, among other things, have caused a
number of athletes to do and say things that have invited the wrath of league
commissioners. While commissioners undoubtedly have a legitimate interest
in safeguarding the integrity of their leagues, current league rules allow them
too much freedom to impinge on the First Amendment rights of their
employees. While some forms of speech and expression are in fact left
unprotected under current First Amendment jurisprudence, 212  the
aforementioned statements and expressions of professional athletes likely
would have gone unproscribed outside of the context of professional sports
leagues.213 Just as "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate," 214 nor should professional athletes be expected to shed
their First Amendment rights the second they walk onto the field of play.
While legal jurisprudence may continue, to prohibit the application of
constitutional protections to professional sports leagues, analogous results can
be achieved by making changes in league constitutions and CBAs. These
changes could help protect professional athletes from the dangers their unique
profession presents. Unfortunately, until professional sports league player
associations are willing to accept their responsibility as catalysts of change,
the "marketplace of ideas" open to citizens in other walks of life will continue
210. For an example, see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 228-37 (discussing the owner
collusion that significantly reduced MLB player salaries throughout the 1980s and the arbitration
proceedings that attempted to resolve the issue).
211. See generally id. at 375-79 (quoting Barry Rona and Major League Baseball Players
Association, Arbitration (1993)).
212. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
213. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 956-1475 (providing helpful
background information on the First Amendment and the current state of the law).
214. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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to slam its doors on professional athletes.
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